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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

FRONT PAGE: NOTES ON THE NATURE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF
HEADLINE TRIALS

LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN*
INTRODUCTION
This is a brief exploration of the world of the sensational trial.1 Mostly, it
is an exploration of the sensational common law trial, and mostly as it was and
is in the United States, with a few examples from England and other societies
thrown in as well.
The common law trial can be quite a dramatic event. It can be dramatic in
a quite literal sense: trials are, or can be, a kind of stage-play, with a definite
story or plot—usually, in fact, two stories or plots, which are in sharp contrast
to each other—and a suspenseful and exciting ending, when the jury files into
the room and announces its verdict. The principle of orality is one of the keys
to the drama of the common law trial. Unlike the classic civil law trial, in
which judges and other officials shuffle documents and papers, the common
law trial has traditionally been an open and public event; moreover, its
procedures put enormous stress on the spoken word. We all have a vivid
mental picture of these trials: the witnesses, sitting to the side of the judge; the
two lawyers, cross-examining witnesses sharply, then arguing in front of judge
and jury; the oral instructions to the jury; and the final, climactic scene, when
the jury announces to the world a judgment of guilty or innocent.
This basic shape of a big criminal trial is familiar to everybody in our
society. It is familiar because the trial is ubiquitous in popular culture.
Criminal justice, in the broadest sense, is the staple of thousands of books,

* I want to thank Andrew Shupanitz and David Oyer for their helpful research.
1. There is surprisingly little general literature on these trials, exceptions include ROBERT
A. FERGUSON, THE TRIAL IN AMERICAN LIFE (2007) and RICHARD L. FOX & ROBERT W. VAN
SICKEL, TABLOID JUSTICE: CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN AN AGE OF MEDIA FRENZY (2001). I should
mention, too, MARY S. HARTMAN, VICTORIAN MURDERESSES (1976). The subtitle of this book
is worth citing: “A True History of Thirteen Respectable French and English Women Accused of
Unspeakable Crimes.” Id. Treatments of media coverage of trials are also valuable, examples
include the Fox and Van Sickel book mentioned above and RAY SURETTE, MEDIA, CRIME, AND
CRIMINAL JUSTICE: IMAGES, REALITIES, AND POLICIES (3d ed. 2007).
Of course, if you added together all the books and articles about particular headline
trials, such as Lizzie Borden, Sacco and Vanzetti, and the rest, you would end up with a truly
enormous list.
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magazine articles, plays, movies, and television shows. It would be impossible
to count how often, on television, for example, the focus of a show is a
criminal trial (or how often shows have a criminal trial as part of the story
line).
Of course, trials in real life come in many shapes and forms. There are
civil trials and criminal trials. Some civil trials are extremely significant, for
all sorts of reasons; massive tort cases, for example, arising out of huge class
actions and asking for damages in the billions of dollars; or, once in a while, a
sensational divorce case, or a will contest that piques the public interest. On
the whole, however, civil trials do not usually catch the eye and ear of the
public. I will confine myself, in this paper, to criminal trials.
Criminal law—criminal justice—performs a number of functions. The
criminal justice system is a complex social system. It includes the criminal
law itself—the codex of rules that label certain actions and behaviors as wrong
and harmful—anything from overtime parking to serial murder. The rest of the
system, from the police to the gas chamber, is more or less geared to catch and
deal with those who violate the criminal code. Most of the work of the
criminal justice system is quite unobtrusive. Actual trials are only a small part
of the system, and big trials an even smaller part. Probably more than ninety
percent of all criminal trials are cut and dried, and nobody outside of the
defendant, the victim, and their families much care. Most trials are, in a way,
nasty and short; they last only a day or two from start to finish. Only a handful
take days or weeks or months, and play themselves out in the blare and glare of
publicity, in courtrooms crowded with visitors. Only a handful get noticed in
the newspapers and perhaps on TV news; a tiny fraction of these are actually
televised. But it is these big trials, these headline trials, which form the subject
of this paper.
As we said, most criminal cases never get to the stage of a trial. This is
even true of felonies—of serious crimes. Plea-bargaining disposes of them.
Prosecution and defense strike a deal. The defendant pleads guilty in exchange
for a lighter sentence, or no sentence, or some other benefit. No trial takes
place. This accounts for more than ninety percent of the felonies in some
jurisdictions.2 Generally speaking, we live in the age of the “vanishing trial.”3
In fact, trials have been doing their vanishing act for more than a century. Not
that big, full-scale trials have ever been common—trials with complex voir
dire, impassioned arguments before the jury, vigorous cross-examination.

2. There is a large literature on plea bargaining. On its origins, see LAWRENCE M.
FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 390–93 (1993); GEORGE FISHER,
PLEA BARGAINING’S TRIUMPH: A HISTORY OF PLEA BARGAINING IN AMERICA 223 (2003).
3. See Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters
in Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459 (2004). See also ROBERT P.
BURNS, THE DEATH OF THE AMERICAN TRIAL (2009).
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Before the age of the plea bargain, most criminal cases did indeed go to trial;
but the “trials” were short, routine, even slapdash.4 Juries were selected in a
hurry.5 The same panel sat in on a whole series of cases.6 The typical “trial”
perhaps lasted an hour or two. And in most of these trials, no lawyer appeared
for the defendant.7
In the aggregate, these routine trials may be of the highest social
importance. They are the heart and guts of the criminal justice system. The
big trials are few in number, but this does not mean that they are not
significant. They are the only ones which break into the daily press. They
make the front page, or the evening news on television. They attract the
attention of the mass media, and through the media, the attention of the general
public. There have been trials of this sort for a long time, in our country and in
other common law countries. It is impossible to get an accurate count of “big”
trials, or indeed to mount any count at all, or even to define them. Their
notoriety varies. Some trials make headlines in Wichita, Kansas, but are
unknown outside of this community. Others, like the trial of O. J. Simpson, set
the whole country ablaze; and resonate even beyond the borders.8 For want of
a better term, and a better definition, I will simply refer to these trials as
headline trials and define them crudely as trials that attract major public
attention. “Major public attention” means, basically, newspaper and other
media coverage—including books, movies, TV shows, and the like.
Today, many of these high-profile trials fall into a category which Fox and
Van Sickel call “tabloid justice.”9 They have a certain sensational character:
they fascinate the public, they launch a thousand conversations, they produce
acres of film, print, and comment. Other aspects of the law, no matter how
important, can hardly compete. It is fair to ask, why do these trials cast such a
spell? And, furthermore, what is their significance in society? Or, to put it
another way—or to ask a somewhat different question—exactly what is their
message?
They do, of course, have a message. Or rather messages. But those
messages are complex, various, and change greatly over time. Originally, big,
showy trials tended to serve political or didactic purposes—the message
justified the medium. Now, more and more, trials rise to the surface for no
other reason than that they captivate the public. Their value, basically, is as

4. Lawrence M. Friedman, The Day Before Trials Vanished, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD.
689, 692 (2004).
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. A great deal has been written about the Simpson case. See, e.g., THE O.J. SIMPSON
TRIALS: RHETORIC, MEDIA, AND THE LAW (Janice Schuetz & Lin S. Lilley eds., 1999).
9. FOX & VAN SICKEL, supra note 1.
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public entertainment. And, more and more, the study of these trials is a study
not so much of the law, as of the mass media and their role in society. The
media propagate these trials. In some sense, today, they create them.
The modern headline trial is, in a way, one of the few survivors of a
phenomenon that was once much more widespread. Criminal justice and the
punishment of criminals were at one time public in the most literal sense. In
colonial America, punishment of crime—law enforcement—was always open
to the eyes of the community.10 Whipping was one of the most common ways
to punish the guilty, and men and women were always whipped in public.
Colonial law also possessed a rich stock of punishments that made use of
public shame and scorn—sitting in the stocks, for example. Often, too,
punishment was public in another sense: offenders carried with them, for the
rest of their lives, visible signs of their crimes and punishments. Everyone has
heard of the scarlet letter. This was not something Nathaniel Hawthorne
dreamed up: for example, under a New Hampshire law of 1701, adulterers
were to wear “for ever after . . . a Capitall Letter: A: . . . Sewed upon their
Upper Garments.”11 Punishment for a burglar, under the Laws and Liberties of
Massachusetts in 1648, was branding “on the forehead with the letter (B).”12 If
the burglar committed the crime on a Sunday, “he shal for the first offence
have one of his ears cut off;” for a second offense, “he shal loose his other
ear.”13
Actual trials were significant as ritual and drama; punishment even more
so. Hanging a condemned man was a mighty public event. Thousands could
and would gather to see the criminal launched into eternity. Clergymen
delivered relevant sermons on the Sunday before an execution. Some of these
were printed and distributed. The last speech of the condemned man was
another popular form of literature in the eighteenth century. More than thirtyfive of these survive.14 Supposedly, these speeches were delivered at the
gallows itself, in the very shadow of death, though in all probability they were
mostly written beforehand, by ministers, jail officials, or the doomed man
himself.15 The texts were meant to be enlightening, moralistic. So, for
example, “poor Julian,” executed for murder in 1733, confessed to
drunkenness and Sabbath-breaking, the start of a slippery slope which led

10. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 2, at 36–41.
11. LAWS OF NEW HAMPSHIRE: PROVINCE PERIOD, 1679–1702, at 676 (Albert Stillman
Batchellor ed., 1904).
12. THE BOOK OF THE GENERAL LAWES AND LIBERTYES CONCERNING THE INHABITANTS
OF THE MASSACHUSETS (1648), reprinted in THE LAWS AND LIBERTIES OF MASSACHUSETTS 4
(1929).
13. Id. at 4–5.
14. DANIEL A. COHEN, PILLARS OF SALT, MONUMENTS OF GRACE: NEW ENGLAND CRIME
LITERATURE AND THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN POPULAR CULTURE, 1674–1860, at 20 (1993).
15. Id.
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downward “to this great Sin for which I now die. . . . O take Warning by me
all of you, I intreat you . . . . turn from your evil Ways.”16 Esther Rodgers
delivered an “emotional statement of warning” just before she was hanged for
infanticide in 1701: “Let me beg of all Young Ones, be not Disobedient, go not
with bad Company, O my dear Friends—Take Warning by me.”17 All this
before a crowd of some four or five thousand spectators.18
The situation changed in the nineteenth century; men and women were still
hanged, but hanging was no longer effective as moral theater. In big, raucous
cities, with a floating population, with slums, crude waterfront saloons, and an
atmosphere prone to rioting and disorders, elite opinion came to reject public
punishment decisively. To hang somebody in front of a crowd of people no
longer seemed to convey moral lessons; on the contrary, it looked like
something that would appeal to the worst instincts of the mob, something that
might incite their appetite for violence, their bloodlust. Punishment went
private. The states began to build “penitentiaries,” huge, guarded buildings,
surrounded by massive walls.19 Condemned men and women were no longer
to be hanged in the public square. Executions retreated into prison yards,
beyond the sight of most people—though people sometimes watched from the
treetops, or from the roofs of houses.20 When the electric chair was invented,
in the late nineteenth century, executions became truly private. Men and
women died deep in the bowels of the prison, away from the masses, and their
deaths were observed only by a handful of witnesses.21
Thus, public executions were gone—officially at least. The reality was
more complex. In the West, the vigilante movement claimed its share of
victims; the vigilantes continued the tradition of death in the open and before
the whole community.22 In the South, there was the dreadful custom of
lynching—violent, often sadistic, but quite open, and carried out in front of

16. Id. at 21.
17. Id. at 63.
18. Id.
19. On the rise of the penitentiary, see generally FRIEDMAN, supra note 2, at 77–82; ADAM
JAY HIRSCH, THE RISE OF THE PENITENTIARY: PRISONS AND PUNISHMENT IN EARLY AMERICA
(1992).
20. See, e.g., LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN & ROBERT V. PERCIVAL, THE ROOTS OF JUSTICE:
CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN ALAMEDA COUNTY, CALIFORNIA 1870–1910, at 305 (Morris S.
Arnold ed., Studies in Legal History Ser., 1981).
21. STUART BANNER, THE DEATH PENALTY: AN AMERICAN HISTORY 150–51, 154–61 (2d
prtg. 2002). William Kemmler was the first person to die in the electric chair. See id. at 151; see
also In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 449 (1890) (upholding electrocution as constitutional).
22. There is considerable literature on the vigilante movement. For a comprehensive
account, see RICHARD MAXWELL BROWN, STRAIN OF VIOLENCE: HISTORICAL STUDIES OF
AMERICAN VIOLENCE AND VIGILANTISM (1975).
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mass audiences.23 In both cases, these public executions were meant to teach a
lesson. Lynching in the South carried the message of white supremacy, in its
cruelest, most barbaric, most naked form. Southern justice was itself an
instrument of white supremacy. But the trial of a black man for rape was not
violent enough, not severe enough, not sufficiently horrible, to serve as an
effective instrument of terror. A black accused of certain crimes could expect
only a short, slapdash trial, and was certain to be convicted. But these trials, in
front of all white juries, apparently did not deliver the right amount of warning,
and did not carry the right symbolic message, the right dose of terror. Only
lynching had that power.
These were important exceptions. The headline trial was another. It
continued to be a bold public event. At times, it served up moral messages and
carried out the didactic function which the whole system had once provided.
These were messages and lessons about crime and its consequences, and about
the norms and values of society. Not that this was, in most cases, what these
trials seemed to be about, on the surface. More and more, these big trials did
nothing more than attract the attention of masses of people—and, of course,
the attention of the popular press.
I. TYPOLOGY
In this essay, I begin by offering a rough typology of these trials, a
catalogue of types. There is, however, no sharp division between the various
types. In fact, not only do the types often overlap, but many famous trials can
and do fall into several of the categories. After setting out this typology, I will
focus more specifically on one or two of the categories, asking some basic
questions: why did these trials capture the fancy and the attention of the
public?
But I begin with the typology:24
A.

Political Trials

The first category is political trials. This has always been an important
type of headline trial. Cases fraught with political significance go back quite
far in legal and social history. Exact definition of a political trial is elusive—
and somewhat arbitrary. Peter Hoffer lists three criteria: the trial must be
politically motivated; the outcome of the trial must be affected by political
considerations; and the trial must have a significant impact on politics.25 This
is a rather severe definition. Its problem is that it leaves out too many trials—
trials that, to the naked eye, do seem quite political, at least if we try some kind

23. See, e.g., LEON F. LITWACK, TROUBLE IN MIND: BLACK SOUTHERNERS IN THE AGE OF
JIM CROW 13 (1998). For a vivid description of a lynching, see SHARON DAVIES, RISING ROAD:
A TRUE TALE OF LOVE, RACE, AND RELIGION IN AMERICA 153–54 (2010).
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of broader definition.26 Hoffer does not consider a trial political, for example,
if it was conducted with due process, that is, if it was scrupulously fair.27 He
has to admit, of course, that the “outcome” even of a fair trial can be “affected”
by politics.
I prefer a vaguer definition (or non-definition): a political trial is a trial that
has political overtones, or appears to have such overtones. It is a trial that has
political meaning. This meaning, and the political significance of a “political”
trial, can and does vary from trial to trial. But generally we know it when we
see it. Most of us, for example, would consider treason trials to be clearly
political. A famous example from the first part of the nineteenth century was
the treason trial of Aaron Burr. Burr was a former Vice-President of the
United States, a notorious political figure, and the charges against him were
sensational. He was accused, no less, of a plot to detach the western parts of
the United States and set up these regions as a separate country, under his
leadership.28 I would also classify the trials of the conspirators who killed
Abraham Lincoln, the trials of Nazi spies, and others guilty or accused of
espionage, and the trials of terrorists and other “enemies of the people” as
political, since beyond a doubt, all of these have political overtones and
meanings.
Political trials are often staged, managed, and closely watched by the
regime, government, or administration. During the Cold War, the United
States government put the leaders of the Communist Party on trial.29 The trial
of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg was an especially notorious political trial. The
Rosenbergs were arrested in 1950, accused of betraying atomic secrets to the
Soviet Union. They were convicted, sentenced to death, and executed in
1953.30 The perjury trials of Alger Hiss were also important political trials,
drenched with the politics of the cold war.31 The Soviet Union itself staged a

24. One of the few earlier attempts to classify headline trials is Ray Surette, Media Trials, 17
J. CRIM. JUST. 293 (1989). He divides “media trials” into three categories, based on the theme of
the trial: “abuse of power and trust,” “sinful rich,” and “evil strangers.” Id. at 296. These seem
useful, as far as they go, but I think it would pay to expand the list of categories, and I have tried
to do so here.
25. PETER CHARLES HOFFER, THE TREASON TRIALS OF AARON BURR 1 (Peter Charles
Hoffer & N.E.H. Hull eds., Landmark Law Cases & Am. Society Ser., 2008).
26. Indeed, Hoffer is thus able to conclude that “in the end, the Burr trials were not political
. . . .” Id. at 2.
27. See id. at 1–3, 5–6.
28. Id. at 77, 147–48.
29. Eleven leaders of the Communist party were convicted of violating a federal law, the
Smith Act, and the convictions were affirmed in Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 495, 517
(1951).
30. See the account in William R. Conklin, Pair Silent to End, N.Y. TIMES, Jun. 20, 1953, at
1.
31. See ALLEN WEINSTEIN, PERJURY: THE HISS-CHAMBERS CASE, at xv–xvi (1978).
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series of notorious show trials in the 1930s to expose real or imagined counterrevolutionaries, and to strengthen the grip of a government that ruled on the
basis of terror.32
Sometimes, defendants try to turn the tables on the government and make
the trial into their political show. This was true of the trial of the Chicago
Seven in 1969–1970. The defendants were radicals, accused of trying to
disrupt the Democratic Convention in 1968.33 They worked to transform their
trial into political theater. They refused, for example, to stand up when the
judge came in and took other actions to show their disrespect toward the
system that had arrested them and was trying to send them to prison.34 They
wanted the trial to become a radical circus. At one point the judge ordered one
defendant, Bobby Seale, bound and gagged.35 The judge cited the defendants’
lawyers for contempt.36 All in all, the trial was an unruly affair; the judge was
sorely provoked, but he did seem, to say the least, prejudiced against the
defendants. All of the convictions and the contempt judgments were reversed
on appeal.37
Sometimes, too, what starts out as an ordinary trial, or which takes the
form of an ordinary trial, develops political significance in the course of the
proceedings. In many ways this was true of the famous case of Sacco and
Vanzetti. Nicola Sacco and Bartolomeo Vanzetti, “two young Italian
immigrants and revolutionary anarchists,” one a “heel trimmer,” and one a
“fish peddler,” were arrested in 1920 for robbing and murdering a “factory
paymaster and security guard” in a suburb of Boston.38 They were convicted
and sentenced to death.39 The case became an international cause celebre, in a
way comparable to the Dreyfus case in France. It polarized opinion in the
United States and abroad. The critics claimed the trial was unfair, and that the
defendants were on trial less for these actual crimes, than for their unpopular
political views. In the end, however, all attempts to save the men ended in
failure, and they were both put to death.40

32. See, e.g., VADIM Z. ROGOVIN, STALIN’S TERROR OF 1937–1938: POLITICAL GENOCIDE
S. Choate trans., 2009).
33. JASON EPSTEIN, THE GREAT CONSPIRACY TRIAL: AN ESSAY ON LAW, LIBERTY, AND
THE CONSTITUTION 52 (Vintage Books 1971) (1970).
34. Id. at 248.
35. Id. at 254.
36. Id. at 413–17.
37. Id. at 430.
38. See, e.g., MOSHIK TEMKIN, THE SACCO-VANZETTI AFFAIR: AMERICA ON TRIAL 1
(2009). This is the latest of the many books on this famous affair and one that deals explicitly
with the political aftermath of the trial.
39. Id.
40. Id.
IN THE USSR 83 (Frederick
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We might also label a trial as political, in the broadest sense, when the
trial, for whatever reason, raises some important issue of policy or principle;
perhaps one on which public opinion is sharply divided. An excellent example
would be the Scopes trial, the famous “monkey” trial, which took place in
Dayton, Tennessee in 1925.41 Scopes, the defendant, was a high-school
science teacher.42 His “crime” was teaching Darwinian evolution, which was a
violation of the laws of Tennessee.43 Scopes, if found guilty, would simply
have to pay some small fine. But the case exploded into a dramatic
confrontation between science and religion. Huge numbers of reporters and
sight-seers invaded Dayton. The trial itself was an utter sensation. Two
famous lawyers, William Jennings Bryan and Clarence Darrow, battled it out
in the courtroom: Bryan for the strict, fundamentalist account of creation;
Darrow for science and skepticism.44 In some ways, Scopes, who had no role
in these goings-on, was nothing more than some kind of bystander, even
though he was the one on trial. The trial itself has been (rather inaccurately)
immortalized in a play (1955) and a classic film (1960) called Inherit the
Wind.45
Clearly, a significant number of headline trials can be labeled political.
Political trials have their own quite extensive literature. Consider, for
example, the Nuremberg trials after the end of the Second World War, in
which prominent Nazi leaders were brought to judgment.46 There was a
parallel trial in Tokyo, in which Japanese leaders were tried for war crimes.47
Many countries ran their own versions of such trials. Trials of Nazi leaders,
some of them sensational, continued for many years (including, very notably,
the trial in Israel of Adolph Eichmann).48 Consider also the growing field of
international criminal law. Various international tribunals, in recent years,
have been set up to bring to trial and punish various tyrants, despots, and mass
murderers—a group, alas, which seems not to be in small supply. There is
now also an International Criminal Court, which sits in The Hague, which has

41. EDWARD J. LARSON, SUMMER FOR THE GODS: THE SCOPES TRIAL AND AMERICA’S
CONTINUING DEBATE OVER SCIENCE AND RELIGION 93, 256 (1997).
42. Id. at 89.
43. Id. at 89–92.
44. Id. at 103–06.
45. Id. at 239–46.
46. There is a huge literature on these trials. See, e.g., PERSPECTIVES ON THE NUREMBERG
TRIAL (Guénaël Mettraux ed., 2008).
47. See generally PHILIP R. PICCIGALLO, THE JAPANESE ON TRIAL: ALLIED WAR CRIMES
OPERATIONS IN THE EAST, 1945–1951 (1979).
48. Eichmann was captured and taken to Israel, where he was put on trial for his crimes.
Homer Bigart, Trial of Eichmann Opens Before Israeli Tribunal, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 11, 1961, at 1.
Eichmann was convicted and executed. Lawrence Fellows, Israeli Public Coldly Silent on
Eichmann Hanging, N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 1962, at 3.
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the mandate of dealing with crimes against humanity.49 Or consider the legal
battles of General Pinochet, the former dictator of Chile,50 and the many
“transitional justice” trials in countries that have moved from dictatorship to
democracy.51 Political trials, then, in the broadest sense, continue to be an
extremely important type of headline trial.
B.

Corruption and Fraud

A second category has as its subject corruption and fraud. This is closely
related to the first category, and might even be viewed at times as a sub-class
of political trials. Impeachment trials, trials of congressmen accused of taking
bribes, and other instances of corruption in high places, are all examples that
fall under this heading.52 The administration of President Warren Harding in
the 1920s was notably corrupt, and the famous Teapot Dome scandal gave rise
to a sensational trial.53 Fraud and corruption, alas, are hardly uncommon in
American history or, for that matter, the history of other countries. Such trials
certainly attract attention, though probably somewhat less than a good lurid
murder might attract. Very few murder trials, to be sure, generated as much
heat and publicity as the attempted impeachment of President Clinton which,
in the end, failed in the United States Senate.54
Corruption and fraud are governmental problems. But there is also private
corruption and fraud—the work of notorious conmen, the crimes and
misdemeanors of officials of the Enron corporation, other big corporate
malefactors, insider trading defendants, people who run Ponzi schemes and the
like. The recent trial of Bernard Madoff, who cheated people out of billions,
certainly made the front page.55 There can be corruption, too, in the world of
sports and entertainment. Here one might mention the scandal of the “Black
Sox”—members of the Chicago baseball team, the White Sox, who took bribes
and threw away victory in the World Series in 1919.56
49. On the tribunals and the ICC, see HELEN M. STACY, HUMAN RIGHTS FOR THE 21ST
CENTURY: SOVEREIGNTY, CIVIL SOCIETY, CULTURE 58–75 (2009).
50. See Rebecca Evans, Pinochet in London—Pinochet in Chile: International and Domestic
Politics in Human Rights Policy, 28 HUM. RTS. Q. 207, 209–11 (2006).
51. See generally TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: GLOBAL MECHANISMS AND LOCAL REALITIES
AFTER GENOCIDE AND MASS VIOLENCE (Alexander Laban Hinton ed., Genocide, Political
Violence, Human Rights Ser., 2010).
52. This category closely resembles what Ray Surette calls “abuse of power and trust” and
identifies as a major theme of media trials. See Surette, supra note 24, at 293–94.
53. See LATON MCCARTNEY, THE TEAPOT DOME SCANDAL (2008).
54. See James Bennet & John M. Broder, President Says He Is Sorry And Seeks
Reconciliation, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 1999, at A1.
55. For a front page article discussing the Madoff case, see Diana B. Henriques & Jack
Healy, Madoff Jailed After Pleading Guilty to Fraud, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 2009, at A1.
56. Eight White Sox Players are Indicted on Charge of Fixing 1919 World Series; Cicotte
Got $10,000 and Jackson $5,000, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 1920, at 1. The players were acquitted,
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C. Was Justice Done?
Another category, which also often overlaps political trials, we can call:
Was Justice Done? These are cases which become famous, or notorious,
because of the way they were conducted. Here we can put cases in which the
defendants were (or may have been) falsely or unjustly accused or were
subjected to the ordeal of trial for base or political reasons. The SaccoVanzetti case can be included here again. Scholars are still arguing over
whether they were guilty or innocent. But most scholars feel the trial itself was
biased and unfair (and so did many contemporaries). Indeed, this was the
reason why many people denounced the verdicts and the sentence. The critics
felt that the real point of the trial was to suppress political dissent and radical
thought. In France, of course, the Dreyfus case is the supreme example of this
category. The Dreyfus case almost tore the country apart and divided the
nation between Dreyfusards and anti-Dreyfusards.
The Scottsboro case was another instance of this genre.57 Nine young
black men were arrested in Scottsboro, Alabama, in 1931.58 They were
accused of raping two white women on a freight train, as it traveled between
Chattanooga, Tennessee, and Huntsville, Alabama.59 The first trial was short
and quite typical of southern justice at the time—at least when defendants were
black. The defense was shockingly brief and inept. Eight of the defendants
were quickly convicted and sentenced to death.60 The defendants were, in fact,
completely innocent. Indeed, one of the “victims” later recanted and admitted
she had lied.61 This seemed to make little difference to judges and juries. The
blatant injustice of the case made it notorious. The United States Supreme
Court reversed the trial court, holding that the trial was so unfair that it violated
the federal constitution.62 Another trial before an all-white jury predictably
produced another flock of death sentences.63 Ultimately, after years in jail, and
tremendous political agitation, the “Scottsboro boys” went free.64
The Leo Frank affair was another notorious instance of southern
(in)justice. Frank was Jewish and ran a pencil factory in Georgia.65 In 1913,
he was accused of the brutal murder of young Mary Phagan, a thirteen-year-old

but barred from baseball. Baseball Leaders Won’t Let White Sox Return to the Game, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 4, 1921, at 1.
57. See DAN T. CARTER, SCOTTSBORO: A TRAGEDY OF THE AMERICAN SOUTH (1969).
58. Id. at 3, 5.
59. Id. at 3, 6.
60. Id. at 48.
61. Id. at 186–87, 232.
62. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932).
63. CARTER, supra note 57, at 239, 370.
64. Id. at 412–13.
65. LEONARD DINNERSTEIN, THE LEO FRANK CASE 5–6 (1968).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

1254

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 55:1243

girl who worked in the factory.66 The evidence against Frank was shaky, to
say the least, but he was convicted and sentenced to death, in an atmosphere
poisoned by general hysteria and rabid anti-Semitism.67 When the Governor
commuted his sentence to life imprisonment, a mob took Frank from the prison
and lynched him. 68
For cases in this category, very often what happens after the trial is more
significant than the trial itself. The proceedings, or the particular verdict or
judgment, create the controversy (and generate the headlines). Sometimes, the
punishment seems so severe as to strike some as grossly disproportionate to the
crime. In California, Caryl Chessman was tried in 1948 for robbery, sexual
assault, and kidnapping.69 He was sentenced to death.70 Chessman spent
twelve years on death row, wrote four books, and became an international
celebrity.71 There was a strong campaign to save his life, but the campaign
failed in the end. Chessman was executed in 1960.72
The trial of the Rosenbergs, husband and wife, was of course a political
trial, and a sensational one. But the sentence produced even more controversy
than the trial or the verdict. The judge sentenced the Rosenbergs to death.73
This harsh sentence touched off a national and international campaign to save
the two from the electric chair. But, like the campaigns for Caryl Chessman
and Sacco and Vanzetti, it ended in failure, and the Rosenbergs were
executed.74
Occasionally, the sentence is thought to be too mild, or simply wrong, and
this is what touches off the controversy. This was certainly true of the
sentencing of Dan White, who assassinated the mayor of San Francisco,
George Moscone, and Harvey Milk, the first openly gay city supervisor.75
White was convicted of manslaughter, not murder, and riots broke out in San
Francisco in protest against the punishment, which was arguably far more
lenient than White deserved.76 One might also mention here the trial of John
W. Hinckley, Jr., who tried to kill President Ronald Reagan on March 30,

66. Id. at 1–2, 5.
67. Id. at 55, 57, 59–60.
68. Id. at 126, 139, 141. Most scholars feel Frank was innocent and that a janitor was the
true killer. Ironically, the janitor was black.
69. THEODORE HAMM, REBEL AND A CAUSE: CARYL CHESSMAN AND THE POLITICS OF THE
DEATH PENALTY IN POSTWAR CALIFORNIA, 1948–1974, at 4 (2001).
70. Id.
71. Id. at 67, 135.
72. Id. at 135.
73. 1,500 Clergy Back Rosenbergs’ Plea, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 1953, at 19.
74. Conklin, supra note 30.
75. S.F. Braces for Gay March: 70 Injured in Violence After “Lenient” White Verdict, L.A.
TIMES, May 22, 1979, at 1.
76. Id.
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1981.77 At the trial, in 1982, Hinckley was found not guilty by reason of
insanity.78 This verdict made a great deal of sense (Hinckley certainly seemed
mentally unbalanced); nonetheless, the jury’s decision set off a storm of
protest. It also led to changes in the (formal) rules about the insanity plea in a
number of states and in the federal government.79
The notorious Massie-Fortescue trials in Hawaii, in the 1930s, provide us
with another example. Thalia Massie, the white wife of a naval officer,
accused five Hawaiian men of rape.80 None of the men were white. The
charge was almost certainly fabricated. The trial was big news in Hawaii. The
evidence against the men was extremely weak. The local jury failed to reach a
verdict, and the five men were discharged.81 Massie and his mother-in-law,
Grace Fortescue, outraged at this turn of events, connived to kidnap one of the
defendants, Joe Kahahawai, probably to try to force him to confess.82 The plan
went tragically awry, and Kahahawai was shot to death.83 A new trial
followed—this time, it was Massie and Grace Fortescue and their confederates
who were accused of crime.84 At this trial, the defendants were convicted.85
But the politics of race deeply colored the whole atmosphere of the trial. Elite
white opinion was outraged by the conviction of Massie and Fortescue, and
there was enormous pressure on the authorities to do something on their
behalf.86 The court had sentenced them to ten years in prison, but the
Governor reduced their sentences to one hour, and they simply went free (and
left the islands).87
Political trials, and trials closely allied to political trials, are arguably the
most significant headline trials, the most important to society. The categories
that follow are quite different. These cases are political only in the sense that
anything that creates a stir, anything that makes headlines, anything that
captures the eyes and ears of the public, can be labeled politically significant,
in the broadest sense. If we imagine a continuum of great trials, we might
77. William F. Lewis, Power, Knowledge, and Insanity: The Trial of John W. Hinckley, Jr.,
in POPULAR TRIALS: RHETORIC, MASS MEDIA, AND THE LAW 114, 116 (Robert Hariman ed.,
Studies in Rhetoric & Commc’n Ser., 1990).
78. Id. at 117.
79. Id. The resulting federal statute was the Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984, Pub L.
No. 98–473, § 401, 98 Stat. 2057 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1984 (Supp. II 1985)); the heart of the
law is currently codified as 18 U.S.C. § 17 (2006).
80. See DAVID E. STANNARD, HONOR KILLING: HOW THE INFAMOUS “MASSIE AFFAIR”
TRANSFORMED HAWAI’I 54–55 (2005).
81. Id. at 217.
82. Id. at 240.
83. Id. at 247.
84. Id. at 288–89.
85. STANNARD, supra note 80, at 380.
86. Id. at 383–87.
87. Id. at 389–90.
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place the overtly political at one end, and at the other end would be trials
which are basically pure entertainment, without any (obvious or clear) social
meaning. These are trials that create a stir, that fascinate the public, and
command the attention of the media, even though they seem to have no impact
other than on the immediate parties.
D. Tabloid Trials
Our fourth category, and the first in this group, consists of what we might
call tabloid trials. These trials titillate the public and cause an enormous
ruckus because of the nature of the crime itself—the defendant is accused of
acts which are sensational, lurid, sometimes disgusting. Millions of readers
and viewers find these tawdry affairs strangely exciting. Some of these seem
to plumb the lowest depths of human pathology. Indeed, the trial itself may
come as an anticlimax: the crimes themselves, as they come to light, make for
the biggest headlines. (And if the crimes remain unsolved—think of Jack the
Ripper, the famous serial killer of late nineteenth century London—there is of
course never any trial at all.)88
Often, however, we know (or think we know) who committed the crimes;
and the trials serve as a kind of public horror movie. One prominent example
was the case of Jeffrey Dahmer, who killed and mutilated more than a dozen
young men; he was convicted in 1991, and murdered in prison a few years
later.89 Another example was William Heirens, the “lipstick killer,” convicted
of three bloody and horrifying murders in Chicago in 1946.90 Heirens
confessed, but later recanted, and to this day there are serious doubts whether
Heirens, who has been in prison for more than fifty years, was actually
guilty.91
Even more lurid was the case of Armin Meiwes, the German cannibal.
Meiwes made use of that new-fangled device, the internet, to search for a
victim, someone even more pathological than he was—a man willing to be
killed and eaten.92 He actually found such a person—an engineer from

88. Book after book has presented a “solution” to the mystery of Jack the Ripper and
apparently dozens of names have been suggested. For example, the mystery writer, Patricia
Cornwell, claimed to have solved the crime in PORTRAIT OF A KILLER: JACK THE RIPPER CASE
CLOSED (2002). Her candidate is an artist, Walter Sickert. Id. at 2. But this is apparently
unlikely. No theory has won general acceptance, and the trail by now is of course extremely cold.
89. Don Terry, Jeffrey Dahmer, Multiple Killer, Is Bludgeoned to Death in Prison, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 29, 1994, at A1.
90. Adam Higginbotham, The Long, Long Life of the Lipstick Killer, GQ, June 2008, at 176,
200.
91. Id. at 200–01.
92. Mark Candler, German Court Convicts Internet Cannibal of Manslaughter, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 31, 2004, at A3.
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Berlin.93 The whole lurid ritual was captured on video for Meiwes’ private
entertainment.94 When Meiwes began the search for a second victim,
somebody talked, and the secret was out.95 Meiwes was then arrested, tried,
and eventually sent to prison for his crimes.96 As one can imagine, the tabloids
of Germany (and elsewhere) had a field day with Armin Meiwes.97
Crimes which have a sexual flavor, or which seem the product of
pathology bordering on insanity (or crossing the border), have for a long time
fascinated the public. Crime literature feeds on these crimes and the trials that
follow them. These crimes were staples of cheap broadsides and brochures in
the nineteenth century, and were a key ingredient in the National Police
Gazette, which flourished in that period.98 In the twentieth century, there was
a fascination with serial killers—men (almost never women) who commit
crime after crime, sometimes without motive, preying on random victims.
E.

Celebrity Trials

What we might call celebrity trials are another important group of headline
trial. These trials are notorious less because of the crime itself, than because
either the victim or the defendant is or was a famous or public figure. In the
1850s, Congressman Daniel Sickles went on trial for murder.99 An anonymous
note warned Sickles that his young wife, Teresa, was unfaithful; she was
having an affair with Philip Barton Key (son of the man who wrote the StarSpangled Banner).100 Sickles confronted his wife, who admitted everything.101
Sickles went out the next day and shot Key to death on the streets of
Washington, D.C.102 His trial, for murder, was a sensation, as one can
imagine. But in the end, with much fuss or delay, the jury set him free, on the
flimsiest of legal theories; clearly, the men on the panel thought that Key
deserved his fate.103

93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Germany: Cannibal Defendant Sought Other Victims, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 2003, at A6.
96. Candler, supra note 92.
97. See, e.g., Der Kannibale von Rotenburg—Jetzt Rede Ich!, BILD-ZEITUNG, June 18, 2009
(Ger.).
98. KAREN HALTTUNEN, MURDER MOST FOUL: THE KILLER AND THE AMERICAN GOTHIC
IMAGINATION 70 (1998).
99. NAT BRANDT, THE CONGRESSMAN WHO GOT AWAY WITH MURDER 162–90 (1991).
100. Id. at 101–02.
101. Id. at 110–11.
102. Id. at 121–22.
103. See id. at 184. Sickles, of course, was obviously guilty; his (legal) defense was
temporary insanity—one of the earliest examples of this particular defense. What really swayed
the jury, no doubt, was the notion that Key got what was coming to him.
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O.J. Simpson—a football hero among other things—is the most famous of
recent celebrity defendants.104 His trial was an incredible media event, beamed
into millions of homes on television and, indeed, watched all over the world.
Here one might mention, too, the trials of Roscoe Arbuckle, generally known
as “Fatty” Arbuckle, in Los Angeles. Arbuckle was an actor, comedian, and
director of silent films—indeed, one of the most famous and successful.105 In
1921, at a party which Arbuckle arranged, an aspiring actress, Virginia Rappe,
became desperately ill; she died a few days later.106 A friend of hers accused
the actor of raping Rappe, and Rappe herself, before she died, had said
something to the effect that Arbuckle had hurt her (though very likely this was
misconstrued).107 Arbuckle was arrested and put on trial for manslaughter.108
There were three sensational trials. The first two ended in hung juries.109
These were both celebrity trials and tabloid trials, with their scandalous
overtones of sex and depravity in Hollywood. The third jury acquitted
Arbuckle, who was almost certainly innocent of the charges.110 But the trials
had ruined his career, and probably shortened his life. Even though a jury had
(finally) exonerated him, his ordeal had left behind a feeling, shared by many
people, that he was actually guilty of the crime or, if innocent of that crime,
that the charges of vice and debauchery must have had some substance behind
them.111
Indeed, the overlap between celebrity and tabloid crimes is quite common.
Celebrity trials may overlap with other categories as well—the impeachment
trial of President Clinton was in some ways a political trial, in some ways a
trial about misconduct in office (perjury), in every regard a celebrity trial, and
in other ways nothing more than a sordid tale about lust and sex in office—a
tabloid trial par excellence.
Celebrity trials make headlines because they are often lurid, and because of
the sheer power of the celebrity name. They are headline trials, too, for a
much more mundane reason. The rich and famous can afford to hire the best,
the most flamboyant, the most newsworthy lawyers. This was certainly true of
O.J. Simpson. Thus, the rich and famous have the means and the will to turn
their trials into media events—something that some poor wretch, accused of
killing another poor wretch in a barroom brawl, can never aspire to.

104. For celebrity trials, see generally GINI GRAHAM SCOTT, HOMICIDE BY THE RICH AND
FAMOUS: A CENTURY OF PROMINENT KILLERS (2005).
105. See DAVID A. YALLOP, THE DAY THE LAUGHTER STOPPED: THE TRUE STORY OF
FATTY ARBUCKLE 83–85 (1976).
106. Id. at 7–9.
107. Id. at 131–32.
108. Id. at 137, 253.
109. Id. at 241, 248.
110. YALLOP, supra note 105, at 253.
111. See id. at 259–62.
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Charles Guiteau shot President Garfield in broad daylight, in the Baltimore
and Potomac Station, in Washington, D.C., in 1881.112 Garfield died of his
injuries.113 Guiteau’s trial was a perfect example of a trial that made headlines
because of the identity of the victim. Guiteau readily confessed to shooting the
President, and in any event, it was perfectly obvious that he had done so.114
The trial turned then, on his only defense, insanity.115 Guiteau’s behavior was
certainly bizarre enough, and he made the trial into a weird kind of circus.116
More basically, the trial became a battle between warring schools of
psychiatry. To us, today, it seems obvious that Guiteau was insane, under any
psychiatric theory one might muster.117 But the jury was not inclined to be
lenient or understanding in light of what Guiteau had done; he was convicted,
sentenced to death, and hanged in 1882.118
In the early twentieth century, Harry K. Thaw, member of a rich and
prominent family, went on trial for killing Stanford White, the leading
American architect of his day.119 The Thaw trial was both a celebrity trial and
a prime example of a tabloid trial. Thaw murdered White because (according
to Thaw) White had “ruined” Thaw’s wife when she was sixteen.120 The two
men had been rivals for her affection; but she chose Thaw, and he became her
husband. Evelyn Nesbit Thaw was “exquisitely lovely,” and the trial was “the
most spectacular . . . . that ever sucked dry the descriptive reservoirs of the
American press.”121 The jury could not reach agreement. In a second trial,
Thaw was found not guilty by reason of insanity.122
Bruno Hauptmann went on trial in 1935, for kidnapping and murdering the
infant child of Charles Lindbergh, a tremendous national hero.123 Thirty-five
years later, Charles Manson went on trial in 1970, for murdering (among
others) the actress Sharon Tate.124 Manson did not commit the crimes himself;

112. CHARLES E. ROSENBERG, THE TRIAL OF THE ASSASSIN GUITEAU: PSYCHIATRY AND
LAW IN THE GILDED AGE 3–6 (Midway reprt. ed. 1989) (1968).
113. Id. at 10.
114. See id. at 5.
115. See id. at 155–57.
116. See, e.g., id. at 162–63.
117. Clinicians in the twentieth century who studied the case, tended to agree that Guiteau
was a paranoid schizophrenic. ROSENBERG, supra note 112, at xiii.
118. Id. at 223, 232, 238.
119. See IRVIN S. COBB, EXIT LAUGHING 198 (1941).
120. See GERALD LANGFORD, THE MURDER OF STANFORD WHITE 101–02 (1962); Emotional
Insanity: The Thaw Defense, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 1906, at 1.
121. COBB, supra note 119, at 198–99.
122. Id. at 242.
123. JIM FISHER, THE LINDBERGH CASE 3, 267 (1987).
124. Douglas Robinson, Manson Called a Megalomaniac By Prosecutor as Trial Begins,
N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 1970, at 22. For background on the Manson trial generally, see VINCENT
BUGLIOSI, HELTER SKELTER: THE TRUE STORY OF THE MANSON MURDERS (1974).
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he was the leader of a strange and cult-like group, which carried out this
murder, and others.125 The Manson case had both celebrity and tabloid aspects
and generated enormous heat and noise. Lee Harvey Oswald assassinated
President Kennedy in 1963.126 Oswald was quickly captured; but in the event,
he never went on trial; Jack Ruby murdered him.127 Ruby’s trial, which
followed, was in a sense a celebrity trial at one remove.128
F.

Whodunit Trials

Another category can be called whodunit trials. These trials gain their
special tingle of excitement from uncertainty—from an air of mystery and
doubt. Was the defendant guilty or innocent? The fictional criminal lawyer,
Perry Mason, appeared in about eighty novels written by Erle Stanley Gardner,
starting in the 1930s. In each of the books, Mason represents a client accused
of murder. These clients, unlike real-life clients, are invariably innocent
(though they always seem guilty, which is why they are put on trial). At the
trial, Mason, through masterful deduction or cross-examination, succeeds in
unmasking the real killer and saving his client. Real life can be much more
ambiguous—and tantalizing. Mystery and uncertainty were clearly aspects of
the Lizzie Borden trial (of which more later). Lizzie was accused of the brutal
axe-murder of her father and step-mother.129 Book after book has been
written, presenting new and different “solutions” to the mystery of who killed
the senior Bordens.130
There were elements of mystery and uncertainty, too, in the notorious case
of Dr. Sam Sheppard, in the 1950s. Dr. Sheppard was convicted of murdering
his pregnant wife, Marilyn, in 1954.131 Sheppard was an osteopath; the
Sheppards were well-to-do suburbanites in the Cleveland area.132 Dr.
Sheppard hardly fit the conventional image of a killer. He insisted all along
that he was innocent of the crime.133 He claimed that an intruder—a bushyhaired stranger—was the real killer, that Sheppard had fought with the man,
and was injured himself.134 Sheppard argued that he could not have inflicted

125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

Robinson, supra note 124.
JOHN KAPLAN & JON R. WALTZ, THE TRIAL OF JACK RUBY 1 (1965).
See id. at 3.
See id. at 12.
EDWARD D. RADIN, LIZZIE BORDEN: THE UNTOLD STORY 2–3 (2d prtg. 1961).
The most likely “solution” is the most obvious one—Lizzie was guilty.
Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 335–38 (1966).
Sheppard v. Maxwell, 231 F. Supp. 37, 39 (S.D. Ohio 1964).
Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 340.
Id. at 336; see also CYNTHIA L. COOPER & SAM REESE SHEPPARD, MOCKERY OF
JUSTICE: THE TRUE STORY OF THE SHEPPARD MURDER CASE 15354, 290 (1995). The coauthor of the book, Sam Reese Sheppard, is the son of Doctor Sheppard.
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his injuries on himself,135 also, that there was no blood on him, as there should
have been, had he been the actual killer.136 The jury convicted him, however,
and he was sentenced to life in prison.137 Ten years later, the United States
Supreme Court ordered a new trial.138 Eight justices felt that the proceedings
had been so tainted with hysteria and publicity that Dr. Sheppard had not had a
fair trial.139 The opinion referred to the “bedlam” that “reigned at the
courthouse” and the “carnival atmosphere” of the proceedings.140 At the
second trial, Sheppard was acquitted.141 There are strong suggestions that Dr.
Sheppard had been telling the truth, that he was innocent of the crime, and that
there really was a murderous intruder,142 but an element of mystery still hangs
about the case.
Mystery also surrounds the case of Claus von Bulow. Von Bulow, a
handsome European, married an American heiress (she had once been married
to an Austrian prince).143 Von Bulow’s wife, nicknamed Sunny, went into a
coma in 1980.144 Was this attempted murder? Had Claus injected her with
insulin? She was still alive at the time of the trial but “curled in the fetal
position . . . a tube implanted in her throat and a feeding tube in her mouth.”145
Tons of newsprint and enormous amounts of television time were spent on this
rather baffling case. The jury deliberated for six days, and then found Von
Bulow guilty. The conviction was reversed on appeal, and a second trial
resulted in acquittal. Nobody knows for sure whether Claus von Bulow was
guilty or not. This case had, of course, strong elements of a tabloid trial as
well.
In 1902, Albert T. Patrick went on trial, accused of murdering William
Marsh Rice, a very wealthy man (and the founder of Rice University).146
Charles Jones, Rice’s valet, had actually done the evil deed, with
chloroform.147 The prosecution felt that Patrick, a lawyer, was the mastermind

135. JACK P. DESARIO & WILLIAM D. MASON, DR. SAM SHEPPARD ON TRIAL: THE
PROSECUTORS AND THE MARILYN SHEPPARD MURDER 89 (2003).
136. COOPER & SHEPPARD, supra note 134, at 109.
137. Sheppard, 231 F. Supp. at 40.
138. Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 363.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 355, 358.
141. COOPER & SHEPPARD, supra note 134, at 329 n.4.
142. Id. at 117, 15354.
143. Susan J. Drucker & Janice Platt Hunold, The Claus von Bulow Retrial: Lights, Camera,
Genre?, in POPULAR TRIALS: RHETORIC, MASS MEDIA, AND THE LAW, supra note 77, at 133,
133.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. For an account of this case, see MARTIN L. FRIEDLAND, THE DEATH OF OLD MAN RICE:
A TRUE STORY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN AMERICA, at ix, 6 (1994).
147. Id. at 11113, 278.
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behind the affair.148 Patrick was tried, found guilty, and sentenced to death.149
Patrick was certainly up to no good, and he probably forged Rice’s will; but
whether Patrick was actually guilty of planning the murder is another question.
Ultimately, the sentence was commuted to life imprisonment, and in 1912, the
governor of New York pardoned Patrick.150 “There has always been,” he said,
“an air of mystery in this important case.”151
In my own town, Stanford, California, the celebrated case of David
Lamson falls into the category of “whodunit.”152 Lamson, who worked for the
Stanford University Press, was accused of murdering his wife in 1933.153 She
was found dead in her bathroom, with a wound on the back of her neck; there
was blood everywhere in the room.154 The police insisted that her death was
foul play; Lamson insisted that it must have been an accident.155 In any event,
there was no obvious motive—the couple seemed to be happily married—and
Lamson never wavered in his claim of total innocence. The case was “frontpage news throughout” the summer of 1933; newspapers “hired motorcycle
couriers to speed the copy and photos back from the courthouse and police
headquarters.”156 At the trial, Lamson was convicted and sentenced to
death.157 His conviction was reversed on appeal.158 A second trial resulted in
a hung jury.159 A third trial was “aborted due to jury list irregularities.”160 The
fourth trial resulted in another hung jury; and the prosecution basically gave up
at this point.161 To this day, the case remains a mystery: did he or did he not
murder his wife?
David Lamson’s life was saved, because the California Supreme Court
thought the evidence against him was too weak to bear the burden of the
verdict. Two subsequent juries simply could not agree on guilt or innocence.
This of course is relatively rare. Trials normally end in a blunt and definitive
way: guilty or not guilty. And usually, these trials put all doubt to rest (for the
public, at any rate). But not always. O.J. Simpson is an outstanding example;
148. Id. at xi.
149. Id. at 236–37.
150. Patrick Freed by Dix After 12-Year Fight, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 1912, at 1.
151. Id.
152. Bernard Butcher, Was it Murder?, STAN. MAG., Jan./Feb. 2000, available at
http://www.stanfordalumni.org/news/magazine/2000/janfeb/articles/lamson.html.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Butcher, supra note 152. On death row, Lamson wrote a book. See DAVID LAMSON,
WE WHO ARE ABOUT TO DIE: PRISON AS SEEN BY A CONDEMNED MAN (1936).
158. Butcher, supra note 152.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
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millions of people are convinced he murdered his wife, and never mind what
the jury decided. There are those who insist that Bruno Hauptman did not kill
the Lindbergh baby. There are some who think that William Heirens was the
victim of a frame-up. The police, so the theory goes, desperately needed to
come up with a solution to the vicious crimes that horrified Chicago; they
simply had to pin the crime on someone. In some cases, the doubts come long
after the trial itself has ended, and in some of these cases, the doubts can never
be removed.
G. Soap Opera Trials
A seventh category I call soap opera trials—trials arising out of lovetriangles, trials that originate in romantic entanglements, in disappointments in
love, in lovers who are abandoned or scorned, and similar situations. In
Oakland, California, the trial of Clara Fallmer, in the 1890s, was headline
news. Clara was a young girl, seduced and abandoned—or so she said—by
young Charlie La Due.162 Clara, fifteen years old and pregnant, shot Charlie
on the streets of Oakland in 1897.163 He died of his wounds.164 Clara was on
trial for murder, and the newspapers breathlessly covered every aspect of the
trial.165 The Sickles trial, too, had something of this flavor, and in many
indeed of the more sensational trials, indeed, love or at least sex plays a major
role. Claus von Bulow had a mistress, and so did Scott Peterson, who was
accused of killing his wife and unborn baby.166
Soap opera trials are often celebrity trials, or tabloid trials, or both. Most
of the defendants in these trials have been men, but occasionally a woman sits
in the dock. Here, one might mention the trial of Laura D. Fair, who shot her
lover, Alexander D. Crittenden, a San Francisco lawyer, in 1870, on board a
ferry boat in San Francisco Bay.167 A sensational trial followed. Her defense
was (temporary) insanity, brought on by delayed menstruation.168 The jury,
however, after less than an hour of discussion, found Laura Fair guilty of the
crime.169 The Supreme Court of California reversed and remanded the case for
a second trial.170 This jury found Laura not guilty “by reason of insanity.”171

162. FRIEDMAN & PERCIVAL, supra note 20, at 239–40.
163. Id. at 239.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Carolyn Marshall, Jury Finds Scott Peterson Guilty of Wife’s Murder, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
13, 2004, at A10. Peterson was convicted. Id.
167. GORDON MORRIS BAKKEN & BRENDA FARRINGTON, WOMEN WHO KILL MEN:
CALIFORNIA COURTS, GENDER, AND THE PRESS 19 (John R. Wunder ed., Law in the Am. West
Ser., 2009).
168. Id.
169. Id. at 34.
170. Id. at 37.
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H. Worm in the Bud Trials
An eighth and particularly interesting category is one I call worm in the
bud trials.172 These are trials that catch the public fancy because they expose
the sleazy underside of prominent or respectable society. The Thaw-White
case was sensational, at least in part, because it seemed to expose the raw
reality behind the life-styles of the rich and famous, the seamy habits and sex
lives of members of Broadway and high society. The Fatty Arbuckle case did
the same for Hollywood. In a more muted but perhaps more significant form,
this was probably an aspect of the Lizzie Borden trial. The case ripped aside a
curtain that covered and concealed a kind of dry-rot, a concealed pathology,
and one which (arguably) was eating away at the pillars of respectable society.
The notion of the “worm in the bud” was a prominent feature of the LoebLeopold case, another (of many) that has been called the “crime of the
century.”173 The two young, rich, and intelligent defendants, Nathan Leopold
and Richard Loeb, had murdered a fourteen-year-old boy, Bobby Franks,
apparently just for the thrill of it and to show that they could commit the
perfect crime.174 But their crime turned out to be very far from perfect. Loeb
and Leopold were soon caught.175 They both confessed that they had killed
Bobby Franks.176 What followed, then, was not strictly speaking a trial at all;
the issue was punishment and sentencing. The Loeb and Leopold families
hired Clarence Darrow, paying him an enormous fee to try to persuade the
judge not to impose the death penalty (in the event, the judge did spare their
lives).177 Many people saw something sinister and disturbing in this whole
affair: a collapse of traditional values, a kind of moral decay that affected rich,
spoiled kids. This was perhaps also the case with the so-called preppy murder,
the murder of Jennifer Levin, strangled in Central Park, New York City, by
Robert E. Chambers, Jr., in 1986. Chambers hardly fit the image of a
“preppy,” but the case did give off a troublesome aura: an aura of dissolute,
hedonistic, sex-mad youth. Much of this, to be sure, was nothing more than
media hype.
I.

Who Would Have Thought?

A sub-category of worm in the bud trials might be called: who would have
thought? Jack the Ripper and other serial killers seem like monsters—

171. Id.
172. I take the phrase from RONALD PEARSALL, THE WORM IN THE BUD: THE WORLD OF
VICTORIAN SEXUALITY, at xi, xii (1969).
173. See HAL HIGDON, THE CRIME OF THE CENTURY: THE LEOPOLD AND LOEB CASE (1975).
174. Id. at 95, 134–35, 319.
175. Id. at 86.
176. Id. at 95.
177. Id. at 135, 266.
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deranged, abnormal, almost creatures from another planet. A different kind of
shock and titillation comes when the horror resides closer to home, in places,
or with people, that are supposed to be innocuous or even beneficial. Who, for
example, would have imagined that a mild-mannered, bespectacled English
doctor, Harvey A. Crippin, could have murdered his wife and stashed her body
in his cellar?178 Who, for that matter, would have thought that a church-going
spinster, like Lizzie Borden, could have dispatched her father and stepmother
with an axe? Or, more recently, that Scott Peterson, a fertilizer salesman with
no criminal record, could have murdered his pregnant wife?179 Or that people
who ran a day-care center in Los Angeles might have been guilty of all sorts of
Satanic practices and gross abuse of children?180 This was the charge in the
notorious McMartin case in Los Angeles, on which more below.
The Parkman-Webster case produced one of the most famous nineteenth
century trials. A professor in the Harvard Medical School, John Webster, was
accused of murdering another professor, George Parkman, and chopping his
body in pieces.181 Medical school professors are not exactly celebrities, but
they are prominent people in their community, and to accuse one professor of
murdering another is a surprising and shocking event. Parkman, moreover,
was a member of an old, rich, and very prominent Boston family.182 There was
a good deal of circumstantial evidence, and Webster, who was heavily in debt
to Parkman, had an obvious motive for killing his colleague.183 The jury found
Webster guilty of the murder, after a long and memorable trial, presided over
by Lemuel Shaw.184 Attempts to get clemency for Webster were unsuccessful,
and he was hanged.185 He was, in all likelihood, guilty of killing Dr. Parkman,
but there are still some questions about the how and the why.186
J.

Moral Panic Trials

A ninth category we can call moral panic. This is not a common type, but
it can be exceedingly important. “Moral panic” refers to a kind of mass
hysteria, an irrational fear that grips the community and spreads like some sort
of infectious disease. The (American) granddaddy of these trials is, of course,
the Salem witchcraft trials. These trials, of course, came long before the age of

178. TOM CULLEN, THE MILD MURDERER: THE TRUE STORY OF THE DR. CRIPPEN CASE 15,
23–24 (1977).
179. Marshall, supra note 166.
180. See generally PAUL EBERLE & SHIRLEY EBERLE, THE ABUSE OF INNOCENCE: THE
MCMARTIN PRESCHOOL TRIAL (1993).
181. HELEN THOMSON, MURDER AT HARVARD 39, 151 (1971).
182. Id. at ix, 131.
183. Id. at 138, 140–41.
184. Id. at 229–30, 238.
185. Id. at 260–62, 272.
186. See THOMSON, supra note 181, at 151–53.
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headlines, but in the small, ingrown New England communities, these trials
created an enormous stir.187 These trials fed on popular beliefs about a vast,
satanic conspiracy.188 Some of the trials during the McCarthy period, resting
on fears of a huge, secret Communist underground, had something of the same
flavor. There are, to be sure, many differences. Almost nobody today takes
witchcraft seriously, and the whole episode in Salem is viewed as a kind of
mass delusion. The emotional fervor that led to and fed on McCarthyism was
arguably a kind of moral panic, but there was an actual Soviet Union and
actual spies and a real conspiracy.189 The reaction, of course, was often
misguided, overdone, aimed at the wrong targets, and the motives behind
McCarthyism were, to say the least, politically suspect.
The infamous McMartin daycare trial in southern California, in the 1980s,
was a more recent example.190 This was the longest and most expensive trial
in American history.191 It began with accusation of sexual abuse, directed
against the employees of a daycare center.192 The woman who made these
accusations, Judy Johnson, was mentally ill, a paranoid schizophrenic, and a
chronic alcoholic who died of liver disease a few years later.193 But the
accusations snowballed. Dozens of parents came to believe that the employees
of the daycare center were sexually abusing the children and indulging in
horrendous satanic rituals.194 The charges were almost certainly completely
unjustified, but they led to a series of sensational trials and spawned satellite
trials in many other cities.195 In the end, none of the McMartin defendants
were convicted, but not all of the defendants in the satellite trials were so
fortunate.196
The trials during the McCarthy period were also, of course, political trials,
and the McMartin trials had definite tabloid elements. But these trials also had

187. See CAROL F. KARLSEN, THE DEVIL IN THE SHAPE OF A WOMAN: WITCHCRAFT IN
COLONIAL NEW ENGLAND 35 (1987).
188. There is a large literature on these trials. See, e.g., PAUL BOYER & STEPHEN
NISSENBAUM, SALEM POSSESSED: THE SOCIAL ORIGINS OF WITCHCRAFT (1974); KARLSEN,
supra note 187.
189. There is a huge literature on McCarthy and McCarthyism. See, e.g., ARTHUR J. SABIN,
IN CALMER TIMES: THE SUPREME COURT AND RED MONDAY (1999); ARTHUR J. SABIN, RED
SCARE IN COURT: NEW YORK VERSUS THE INTERNATIONAL WORKERS ORDER (1993); ELLEN
SCHRECKER, MANY ARE THE CRIMES: MCCARTHYISM IN AMERICA (1998).
190. On these trials, see EBERLE & EBERLE, supra note 180; DEBBIE NATHAN & MICHAEL
SNEDEKER, SATAN’S SILENCE: RITUAL ABUSE AND THE MAKING OF A MODERN AMERICAN
WITCH HUNT (1995).
191. 2d Trial Opens in Preschool Molestation Case, N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 1990, at A13.
192. NATHAN & SNEDEKER, supra note 190, at 70, 88–89.
193. Id. at 92.
194. Id. at 84–85.
195. Id. at 92, 107–09.
196. See id. at 92, 108.
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their own distinctive features. Moral panics do not come from nowhere, and in
each case, some aspects of the social context touches off the panic. This
explains why these episodes spread so rapidly and with such dangerous side
effects.
II. THE ROLE OF THE MEDIA
But indeed, each category has meaning and interest for the study of social
history. Each of them tells us something about our society and, more and
more, about the role of the media in that society. Indeed, the media have
become a critical factor in explaining the why and the wherefore of headline
trials.
In the discussion so far, I have stressed characteristics of the crime itself
and of the protagonists and classified cases accordingly. Now we ask: what
makes these cases notorious? When a President is assassinated, the answer is
obvious. The type of crime also plays an important part—the bizarre and the
lurid attract attention or the sheer scale, as in Timothy McVeigh’s attack on the
federal building in Oklahoma.197 Sometimes, the case is part of a larger
American drama. Race relations, for example, have been a salient aspect of
American political and social life for centuries. In some of the great trials, race
has been the elephant in the room. The Massie-Fortescue trials in Hawaii were
a drama about white supremacy on the multi-racial island of Hawaii. The
Scottsboro case arose out of the tortured history of race relations in the
American south.
But in some cases it is, on first blush, hard to see exactly why a particular
case became so notorious. It is tempting, sometimes, to say that the
explanation lies outside the case itself: in the media, or rather, in the coverage
of the case, and the way the media stirred up the pot. The Sam Sheppard case
is the classic example. No doubt the case would have attracted some attention
under any circumstances. But the Cleveland newspapers had a field day with
it.198 They decided, early on, that Sheppard had killed his wife, and they
demanded action from the authorities.199 They were partly responsible, too, for
the atmosphere in the courtroom—the excitement, the turmoil, the crowds of
reporters—an atmosphere so exaggerated, that it led the Supreme Court to
hold, as we have seen, that the trial had been grossly unfair.200

197. McVeigh was tried, sentenced to death, and executed in June 2001. See Jim Yardley,
Execution on TV Brings Little Solace, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 2001, at A26.
198. See COOPER & SHEPPARD, supra note 134, at 16.
199. Id. at 76–77; Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 340 (1966).
200. See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
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Juries and the Unwritten Law

It is hard, then, to divorce the impact of the trials, and the nature of the
trials, from the role of the media. The history of headline trials is, in many
ways, a history of media coverage of crime and punishment. This becomes
more and more the case as we reach contemporary times. Nonetheless, the
trials themselves are very often striking social documents. They sometimes
shed a blinding light on social norms that are otherwise shrouded in darkness
and would otherwise be almost impossible to document. Take, for example,
the so-called “unwritten law” that protects a husband who kills his wife’s
lover.201 In the trial of Congressman Sickles, the defense hammered away at
this point—Philip Barton Key was an evil man; he deserved to die.202 He was
an adulterer. The Bible itself prescribed death by stoning for adulterers. Of
course, the Bible was not part of the penal code of the District of Columbia,
and the formal law of the District contained no such defense. That Sickles was
(factually) guilty was perfectly obvious. His only legal defense was temporary
insanity. The news about Teresa’s betrayal, the argument went, was so
devastating that it unhinged Sickles, at least temporarily.203 This defense was
flimsy, to say the least. Yet the jury in short order acquitted Sickles and set
him free.204 They followed the “unwritten law.”
The “unwritten law” is an example of one important but implicit role of the
jury in our system. As we know, a jury never gives reasons for its decisions.
It simply decides. As far as the great German sociologist, Max Weber, was
concerned, jury decisions in the common law system were examples of
“irrational” decision-making.205 He put the jury in the same category as trial
by ordeal, the consulting of oracles, or reading the entrails of birds.206 But
precisely because the jury never gives reasons, it can bend the law without
owning up to what it is doing. This has surely occurred time and again. The
unwritten law condemned Key, not Sickles, to death.207 The unwritten law was
invoked in the trial of Harry K. Thaw, who, after all, was on trial for killing the

201. Robert M. Ireland, The Libertine Must Die: Sexual Dishonor and the Unwritten Law in
the Nineteenth-Century United States, 23 J. SOC. HIST. 27, 27 (1989).
202. BRANDT, supra note 99, at 179.
203. Id. at 172–73.
204. Id. at 184.
205. 6 MAX WEBER ON LAW IN ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 63, 79 (Max Rheinstein ed., Edward
Shils trans., 20th Century Legal Philosophy Ser., 3d prtg. 1969). Lawmaking and law finding are
“formally irrational” when they use “means which cannot be controlled by the intellect, for
instance when recourse is had to oracles.” Id. at 63. The jury, according to Weber, resembles the
oracle, “inasmuch as it does not indicate rational grounds for its decision.” Id. at 79.
206. Id. at 78–79.
207. See BRANDT, supra note 99, at 186.
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man who (he said) had “ruined” his wife.208 It is found in quite a number of
other instances.
We rarely know, of course, what actually goes on in the jury room—in a
case like the trial of Congressman Sickles, for example. But there are enough
examples of the “unwritten law” to suggest, very strongly, that it reflected a
genuine social norm and influenced the behavior of juries. There were and are
no doubt many other “unwritten laws.” No penal code ever suggested that a
man could not be convicted of raping a woman if she was flirtatious or
promiscuous or hung out at bars or wore tight or revealing clothing. But
(male) juries in the past simply would not convict a man for raping such a
woman.209 Patient analysis of actual jury behavior might uncover many other
“unwritten laws.”
B.

Tales From the Courtroom

In a major trial, the lawyers on either side have to construct a coherent,
sympathetic, story to tell to the jury. The stories may be, of course, in total
conflict with each other. Often it is hard to know which one is more accurate.
A good deal of the time, neither story makes complete sense, and many times
neither attorney is playing from a full deck. Nonetheless, the stories
themselves are revealing. They expose, in an open and dramatic way, common
stereotypes, attitudes, and norms of the period. The lawyers have to appeal to
ideas, images, and concepts that (they hope) will sway the jury. They try to
construct the story of their client so as to make it convincing or sympathetic for
the jury, hoping the jury will carry that story, and not the opposing story, into
the room when they deliberate.
In the case of Clara Fallmer, for example, the defense stage-managed the
defendant with exquisite care. They dressed her in blue, her face was veiled,
and she clutched a bouquet of violets in her hand.210 The defense painted a
picture of an innocent victim, pure as the driven snow; the man she killed, in
turn, was branded a heartless cad who seduced and abandoned a young girl.211
The prosecution tried to suggest quite a different version of Clara—hinting
strongly that she was far from the innocent dove the defense described.212
Today, we would probably describe Clara as a sexually active teenager—
neither an angel nor a whore. But the world of the 1890s could not accept such

208. Emotional Insanity: The Thaw Defense, supra note 120.
209. For the classic study, see HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY,
249–54 (3d prtg. 1966).
210. FRIEDMAN & PERCIVAL, supra note 20, at 239.
211. Id. at 242.
212. Id. at 239–44. This was another case in which the real defense was simply that the
victim deserved what he got; the legal hook, as in the Sickles trial, was temporary insanity. Id. at
242.
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a picture of a young woman’s behavior. In the standard imagery of the times, a
girl like Clara had to be one or the other: a blameless victim, or a fallen
woman.
C. A Dash of History
Political trials have a long and distinguished pedigree. There have been
innumerable examples—one thinks immediately of Joan of Arc or Anne
Boleyn, Henry VIII’s unfortunate wife who forfeited her position and her head.
Of course, the outcomes of these trials were generally not in doubt. A King
never loses his case. Some of these trials rested on pure malice or revenge or
were ways to get rid of a political rival. But they were, no doubt, also designed
to teach the relevant public a lesson. You defy or anger the King at your peril.
Or the Queen. Elizabeth I disposed of her rival, Mary Queen of Scots, after
holding her a prisoner for years.213 Political trials continue to be important in
contemporary times as well. We have mentioned some examples. Indeed,
there may be more trials with political overtones than ever before—if one
includes corruption trials and scandals of various sorts involving political
figures.
Of course, headline trials, in our sense, could hardly exist before there
were headlines. The true headline trial only came into its own in the
nineteenth century; it depended for its very existence on mass-market
newspapers and magazines. “Worm in the bud” trials can probably be dated to
the same period. These trials all involve or suggest a kind of critique of
society, or at least some aspect of society. This critique is implicit in the
prosecution, for the most part. The defense tells quite a different story. So, as
we said, in the trial of Lizzie Borden, her defense was, in a way, a defense of
traditional bourgeois society, and the prosecution, by implication at least,
mounted a critique of that society.
The “worm in the bud” trial is specifically nineteenth century. The
concept itself is one that lies at the base of the mystery novel. The mystery, as
a literary form, can be traced to the beginning of the nineteenth century.214
Whether it was Edgar Allan Poe or someone else who first invented the form is
not particularly important. The chronology is reasonably clear. One of Poe’s
stories, “The Mystery of Marie Roget,” which has a place of honor in the
history of the genre, was based on a real incident.215 This was the sensational
case of a young woman, Mary Rogers, who was murdered in 1841 in Hoboken,

213. 2 EUROPE 1450 TO 1789: ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE EARLY MODERN WORLD 249
(Jonathan Dewald ed., 2004).
214. Lawrence M. Friedman, True Detective, 14 STUD. L. POL. & SOC’Y 9, 9–10 (1994);
Lawrence M. Friedman & Issachar Rosen-Zvi, Illegal Fictions: Mystery Novels and the Popular
Image of Crime, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1411, 1415 (2001).
215. RAYMOND PAUL, WHO MURDERED MARY ROGERS? 83 (1971).
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New Jersey.216 The investigation into Mary Rogers’ death was “passionately
conducted by a circulation-crazed press,” and (in the opinion of Raymond
Paul, who wrote a book about the case) “firmly established the gentle practices
of the yellow press” long before William Randolph Hearst.217
In the classic mystery, a crime is committed—usually but not always
murder—and nobody (especially the reader) has any idea who did it. At the
end of the story, the true killer is unmasked. In the best, and most famous, of
the mystery novels, the author withholds the identity of the killer until the very
last chapter, and in a good or successful mystery, the unmasking comes as a
big surprise. It is no accident that this literary form appears at one particular
moment in history. In the nineteenth century, social relationships had become
much more fluid than in the past. Society was more mobile in every sense—
geographically mobile and also mobile in the sense of movement up and down
the social ladder. In a small town and in a traditional society, everybody
knows everybody else. But in big cities, and in periods of great mobility,
every day one meets with and interacts with total strangers. For the first time,
then, identity becomes problematic. We think we know who people are and
what they are like by reading their outward signs: the way they talk, dress, or
behave. But all this can be simulated—a person can invent, and pass off, a
counterfeit self. At least among gullible strangers.
This was the period, then, of the “confidence man,” a scam artist, a person
who makes money by pretending to be something he is not. A writer in the
1870s claimed that “no city in the Union” was as full of “impostors of all
kinds” as New York.218 “The immense size of the city, the heterogeneous
character of the population, and the great variety . . . of the people, are all so
many advantages to the cheat and swindler.”219 New York could perhaps
justly claim a special place in the world of the con man, but in fact there were
con men everywhere.220 The mortal enemy of the confidence man was the
detective. This role—the role of the detective—was also invented in this
period, to serve as a kind of antidote to the rise of the con man.221 The “con
man” preyed on society, through tricks, artifices, disguises, and outright lies.
The detective was the expert with the skill to unmask this sneaky kind of
criminal. The ordinary police force had the job of keeping order in public
places; the police handled those who committed open and notorious crimes on
the streets, in bars, and among urban mobs. The police officer wears a uniform

216. Id. at 1.
217. Id.
218. JAMES D. MCCABE, LIGHTS AND SHADOWS OF NEW YORK LIFE; OR, THE SIGHTS AND
SENSATIONS OF THE GREAT CITY 316 (1872).
219. Id.
220. See Friedman, True Detective, supra note 214, at 10.
221. See Friedman & Rosen-Zvi, Illegal Fictions, supra note 214, at 1416.
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to advertise who he is and what he does. The detective operates quietly, in
plain clothes, and secretly; only in this way could he do battle with the con
man and others in the clandestine army of malefactors.
In many trials—and particularly in those we called the whodunit trials—
identity (that is, true identity) is also very much at issue. Who was this person,
really, who is on trial? A respectable citizen, falsely accused, or a heartless
killer? A loving husband or a faithless murderer? The classic mystery novel
raised questions of identity but, in the end, gave us definitive answers. In the
last chapter, knots were unraveled, mysteries resolved, and the criminal finally
revealed. The trial also usually provides a kind of answer: the jury brings in a
verdict, and this is, in its own way, definitive. But unlike the trials and
mysteries of fiction, we cannot always be sure if the jury got it right. In many
headline trials, doubts remain.
In those cases I called “worm in the bud,” what is sometimes on trial is
nothing less than a way of life or, perhaps more accurately, the trial raises
questions about common assumptions—assumptions about the nature of
society or the nature of life in society. Cara Robertson made this point in her
perceptive article about the Lizzie Borden case: “trials make explicit prevailing
ideologies by providing opposing narratives.”222 The Borden trial made vivid
use of those stories that the “culture wanted and expected to hear.”223 This is,
perhaps, what made the Lizzie Borden case seem so important to people living
at that time. It is what attracted hordes of reporters. In the end, the jury
acquitted Lizzie, even though she had behaved very suspiciously and there was
considerable evidence pointing in her direction.224 The prosecution’s case was,
in a way, like turning over a big, smooth stone, and watching the vermin crawl
out. This was the fatal flaw in the prosecution’s case. As Cara Robertson put
it, to convict Lizzie Borden was to convict the world in which she lived and to
question its most basic assumptions.225 Convicting Lizzie would cast doubt on
“the entire basis for social order and hierarchy . . . .”226 This was “the
subversion buried at the heart of the case.”227 It would be better, then, “to let
one woman get away with murder than to suggest that a dutiful middle-class
daughter like Miss Lizzie might be capable of it.”228 The very idea that a
church-going spinster—a woman from the upper middle class—could commit

222. Cara W. Robertson, Representing “Miss Lizzie”: Cultural Convictions in the Trial of
Lizzie Borden, 8 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 351, 356 (1996).
223. Id.
224. Id. at 361–62.
225. Id. at 415.
226. Id. at 416.
227. Robertson, supra note 222, at 416.
228. Id.
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such a brutal, savage, pathological, crime cast the shadow of doubt over the
traditions and values of bourgeois society.
Thus, by this account, the jury perhaps simply could not bring itself to
convict. To these men, a woman of her type, her class, her place in society,
was simply incapable of committing such a fiendish crime: killing her own
father with an axe, an act of senseless brutality. To find her guilty would have
been, in a sense, an indictment of bourgeois society. This is, of course,
something of an exaggeration, but it has a core of truth. Thus, the outcome of
the trial rested on assumptions about gender and class. These assumptions
have weakened, but they are still with us, which may be one reason why the
case seems endlessly and timelessly fascinating.
To be sure, everybody knows that there are hidden lives and hidden aspects
of lives, secrets in families, skeletons in countless closets. But it was
important—certainly in the nineteenth century—to keep these matters private,
to hide them behind a curtain of secrecy.229 It was particularly important to
protect the elite from scandal. How else could a democratic society justify
privilege and position for the rich and the mighty? Headline trials threw open
doors into secret rooms, rooms the public was not meant to see. This was one
source of the drama of these trials. Bourgeois society was on trial or
Hollywood or the halls of government or conventional suburban life. The trial
itself was bad enough—the trial possibly threatened the harmony of society,
but at least some of the damage could be repaired, if the jury reached the right
decision.
I have argued elsewhere that certain quirks of nineteenth century law
suggest a tendency, which might have been unconscious or implicit, to protect
the reputations of elite men and women, even when these men and women did
not deserve this protection.230 This was perhaps based on an implicit
assumption: that the masses must have faith in the honesty and integrity of
elites. Impairing this faith meant impairing the social order. Blackmail, for
example, can be explained in these terms. Blackmail is a curious crime, which
has puzzled many commentators. In blackmail, the “perpetrator” coerces the
“victim” into paying money for silence—even though it is the “victim,” not the
perpetrator, who has committed some terrible and secret offense. The
blackmailer, in fact, almost always comes from a lower stratum of society; the
“victim” is almost always a member of the elite. Blackmail, then, is a crime
because it is an attack on the elite; it threatens their reputations. Repression of
these secrets is better for society—or so it can be argued.231

229. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, GUARDING LIFE’S DARK SECRETS: LEGAL AND SOCIAL
CONTROLS OVER REPUTATION, PROPRIETY, AND PRIVACY 4 (2007).
230. Id.
231. On this point, see id. at 81–100; see also ANGUS MCLAREN, SEXUAL BLACKMAIL: A
MODERN HISTORY 37 (2002).
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The same idea—protecting the upper classes—may (consciously or
unconsciously) lie behind the tremendous amount of self-censorship that the
media practiced until quite recent times. Dozens of reporters must have known
about President Kennedy’s sexual adventures, but they never reported what
they knew.232 The British press was careful not to publish anything that would
show the royal family in an unfavorable light.233 While the whole world was
buzzing with gossip about King Edward VIII and Wallis Warfield, the British
newspapers kept a discreet silence.234 They broke the news when only the
King himself went public.
It would be only a slight extension of this general idea to cover cases like
Lizzie Borden’s. Putting a woman like Lizzie Borden on trial violated an
unspoken norm: nice people, leaders of society, moral and respectable people,
do not do nasty and criminal things. Acquitting Lizzie, thus affirmed this
norm. It might be a myth that a Lizzie Borden is incapable of crime, but
society lives on myths. Headline trials in the nineteenth century, then, were at
times a danger point for social order. They had vast public appeal, but were
also deeply problematic.
Crime, of course, is a serious issue and a serious social problem; crime,
particularly violent crime, is a threat to personal security. In a number of
periods—notably the 1950s and later—crime rates were a burning issue in
American society. But (in rich, developed societies, at any rate) even a high
rate of violent crime does not really threaten the established order. Putting
Lizzie Borden in the dock does not seem to have the political overtones of a
treason trial, a terrorism trial, or a trial of political dissenters. Yet the case was
unsettling, in a way that a barroom brawl or a stabbing in a gang fight could
never be—and perhaps not even a political trial like that of Sacco and Vanzetti
or the Rosenbergs, for the reasons already mentioned.
Perhaps people have always been drawn to crime, like moths to the flame.
Perhaps violent, extraordinary crimes have always exuded a kind of fatal
attraction. Certainly, even traditional people have their rituals, mysteries, and
trials. There is an esthetic and sociological connection between the lure of
headline trials in modern society, and the tales about ghosts, spirits, and
supernatural wonders in traditional society: glimpses into secret worlds, worlds
beyond normal experience. Ghost stories still have a certain appeal but only as
fiction; most people today no longer believe in ghosts. Mystery and mysteries,
and crime and punishment, occupy some of the same social space as tales of
wonder and magic. Jack Katz has speculated as to why crime and violence are

232. See ARI ADUT, ON SCANDAL: MORAL DISTURBANCES IN SOCIETY, POLITICS, AND ART
1 (2008).
233. Walter F. Leysmith, Restraint of Press Poses British Issue, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 1936, at
E4.
234. Id.
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so fascinating and so problematic. One reason that he gives fits into our
analysis: some headline trials expose matters that tend to undermine public
faith in institutions. Katz mentions “reports of torture or sexual abuse
occurring at child care centres” as an example.235 This trial, then, was very
much a worm-in-the-bud affair, as well as the result of a moral panic. In such
cases, the public is troubled and even horrified—but at the same time,
fascinated. The trial adds another layer of interest to troubling and horrific
stories about crime. It dramatizes them. Personalities come alive on the
witness stand during cross-examination, in ways that would otherwise be hard
to achieve. Perhaps contemporary headline trials do not so often raise basic
questions about society and social institutions. But sometimes they do. The
O.J. Simpson trial certainly invoked issues about the role of racism in modern
America.236
D. Celebrity Trials
Celebrity trials are one of our categories—trials with celebrity victims or
celebrity defendants. In the true celebrity trial, the victim, defendant, or both
come from the ranks of elite society. The rich and the famous are vastly
overrepresented in headline trials. In part, this is only natural. The rich and
the famous are the ones who can afford expensive, flamboyant lawyers, and
they are among the few who can decide, on balance, to run the risk and the
expense of a full trial. But arguably, all front-page trials are, or become,
celebrity trials. Probably not one person out of a million had ever heard of
Lizzie Borden or Sam Sheppard or Claus von Bulow or Scott Peterson before
they were accused of committing an awful crime, and then became the central
figure in a sensational trial. By the time the trial began, however, they had
become household names.
We live in a celebrity society, and the affairs of celebrities, their habits,
their daily lives are matters of profound public interest, for better or for worse.
A celebrity is not just a famous person; a celebrity is famous, to be sure, but is
also a familiar person, somebody we know and recognize from the media.237
We know—or think we know—everything about celebrities, because we see
and hear them every day. The President, for example, is a celebrity of
celebrities. We know his walk, his talk, his gestures, how he looks; we know
his family, his history, his background; we know what his voice sounds like
and what kind of clothes he wears. This engenders a feeling that we have a

235. Jack Katz, What Makes Crime ‘News’?, 9 MEDIA, CULTURE & SOC’Y 47, 52 (1987).
His example was, of course, inspired by the tremendous uproar over the McMartin case. See
supra notes 190–96 and accompanying text.
236. ADUT, supra note 232, at 18.
237. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, THE HORIZONTAL SOCIETY 27–41 (1999); RICHARD
SCHICKEL, INTIMATE STRANGERS: THE CULTURE OF CELEBRITY 4 (1985).
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right to know everything about them. Hence, nobody and nothing is sacred
today—not the President, not the British royal family, and certainly not movie
stars and basketball players. If every headline trial is, in a way, a celebrity
trial, today’s public will quite naturally be mesmerized by these trials. Thus, in
a sense, the headline trial is a natural outgrowth of a celebrity society. And
because celebrity trials have great audience appeal, they are very valuable,
economically, to newspapers and other media.
The media feed on scandals of the rich and famous and powerful to an
extraordinary degree. The celebrity society—and the public feeling about a
right to know—bring about changes in the law. In a reflection of current social
norms, “public figures” have been stripped of almost all of their privacy rights.
And, indeed, the definition of a “public figure” has been vastly expanded.
Once a person falls into this category, there are almost no limits to what
newspapers may print about him or her.238
Defendants in headline trials are, as said, public figures almost by
definition. There is a kind of circular process here. The media help create the
sensational trial. Once the public shows an interest in the crime and in the
trial, then covering the trial in all its gory detail is (according to the courts) a
matter of public interest. The defendants, thus, tend to lose whatever rights of
privacy they might once have had. In some countries in Europe, the law has
not gone quite so far. Just because the public is interested in a matter does not
mean that the public has a right to know everything about it. Hence, in a wellknown German case from the 1970s, a defendant in a sensational trial, who had
served a time in prison and been released, had the right to prevent a television
program from rehashing the details of the trial.239 Would this case come out
the same way in the United States? In Briscoe v. Reader’s Digest Association,
the plaintiff had hijacked a truck eleven years earlier.240 A California court felt
the magazine should not have revealed his name; he had a right to sink back
into obscurity.241 Recent trends in European law suggest a great sensitivity to
privacy, even for public figures. Princess Caroline of Monaco, for example,
was able to suppress photographs that showed her going about her daily life,
doing her chores in public spaces, even though she was a public figure.242

238. See Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 147, 154–55 (1967).
239. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] June 5, 1973, 35
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 202 (Ger.).
240. Briscoe v. Reader’s Digest Ass’n, 483 P.2d 34, 36 (Cal. 1971), overruled by Gates v.
Discovery Commc’ns, Inc., 101 P.3d 552 (Cal. 2004).
241. Briscoe, 483 P.2d at 40, 44.
242. Von Hannover v. Germany, 40 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1, 24, 28–29 (2005).
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Headlines

In our times, one must understand headlines to understand headline trials.
The role of the media is crucial. In the nineteenth century, periodicals like the
National Police Gazette, along with cheap pamphlets and broadsides, fed the
public appetite for tales of crime and punishment with great zest, if not
accuracy.243 After 1820, the “popular literature of murder” grew “at an
increasing pace,” with the growth of “an era of information abundance.”244
The period of “yellow journalism” battened on this hunger for sensation. The
newspapers saturated the public with news of the biggest and juiciest trials;
they hired “sob sisters” to emphasize “human interest”;245 they sent reporters to
the trials in great numbers. The “yellow press” specialized in sensational
coverage, but even such dignified newspapers as the New York Times
participated in this “news frenzy,” competing with the more down-market
newspapers in this regard.246 Trials like the trial of Lizzie Borden or Harry K.
Thaw were the bread and butter of mass circulation newspapers.
One strand of elite opinion was always horrified at the epidemic of news
about violence and crime. Many people felt that an obsession with violence
and crime—like public hangings in an earlier period—could corrupt the
masses. This was, of course, not true of political trials; the argument went to
trials where the crimes were lurid and disgusting, especially if there was a
sexual element. Some states had laws which tried to limit newspaper coverage
of sensitive aspects of criminal justice—for example, details of executions.247
The press usually found ways to get around any such limitations. One motive
behind censorship laws was the fear that unsavory reporting could lead to
public corruption. State laws not only banned pornography, in some cases they
tried to limit the reporting of crime news. Thus, a Kentucky statute, still in
effect in the 1940s, made it a crime to print or publish any book or newspaper
“whose principal characteristic is criminal news, police reports, or accounts of
criminal deeds, or pictures or stories of deeds of bloodshed, lust, or crime . . . .
“248

243. HALTTUNEN, supra note 98, at 70.
244. Id. at 69.
245. For an example of “sob sister” at work, see GILES FOWLER, DEATHS ON PLEASANT
STREET: THE GHASTLY ENIGMA OF COLONEL SWOPE AND DOCTOR HYDE 162, 163–66 (2009),
on the work of Winifred Black.
246. See Trevor D. Dryer, “All the News that’s Fit to Print”: The New York Times,
“Yellow” Journalism, and the Criminal Trial 1898–1902, 8 NEV. L.J. 541, 568 (2008).
247. A 1889 Minnesota law required executions to take place at night and prohibited
newspapers from printing any details—no reporters were to be present, and the newspaper could
only tell its readers that an execution had taken place, nothing more. 1889 Minn. Laws 66–67
(repealed 1923); JOHN D. BESSLER, DEATH IN THE DARK: MIDNIGHT EXECUTIONS IN AMERICA
98 (1997).
248. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 436.110 (West 1942).
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In some sensational trials, if testimony unfit for the tender ears of women
was expected, judges excluded or tried to exclude women from the courtroom.
This happened, for example, in the trial of Harry K. Thaw for murdering
Stanford White (1907).249 This trial was so sensational that it caught the beady
eye of the President (Theodore Roosevelt). Roosevelt reportedly asked the
Postmaster General to look into “the use of the mails by newspapers which
have printed the full details” of this trial; federal law, after all, forbade sending
“obscene matter” through the mails.250 When they burst on the scene in the
twentieth century, movies were a particular target of the censors. They were
cheap and popular with ordinary people, and dark theaters were deemed a
danger to the morals of the young. Movie censorship—or attempted
censorship—has a long and complex history.251 All of these phenomena
reflected the same impulse that lay behind blackmail laws—and obscenity laws
in general. Society was brittle, fragile; it hung in the balance at all times. To
throw mud on its natural leaders was a dangerous act of rebellion. And to
allow the lower orders access to tales of crime and depravity was similarly
dangerous.
Movie censorship had a definite impact on the production and the content
of films. But the various laws against lurid press coverage probably had little
or no effect. From the age of “yellow journalism” and its “sob sisters” on, the
media succeeded in providing a vicarious experience of the sensational trials—
an experience perhaps even more thrilling than actually sitting in the
courtroom. And despite rigid codes, crime and punishment were staples of the
movies; criminals, however, had to come to a bad end, which presumably
made the depiction of crime more palatable. Then came television and, at the
end of the twentieth century, the internet; trials, crimes, murders were constant
fodder for all of these.
Fascination with headline trials, then, has probably never been so great as
it is now; never has the public seemed so hungry for the lurid and bizarre.
Every night, on television, before audiences of millions, real and fictional
crime shows enact, parse, and (usually) solve a devastating multitude of
murders, rapes, and other violent crimes. We live in the age of what Fox and
Van Sickel have called “tabloid justice.” The mass media focus on “the
sensationalistic, personal, lurid, and tawdry details of unusual and high-profile

249. Jerome Checks Thaw Defense, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 1907, at 1. The judge ordered all
women “excluded, unless they could show that they were newspaper women, definitely assigned
to cover the trial by their city editors.” Id.
250. Id. I am indebted to Mark Hernandez for this reference.
251. On censorship of the movies, see FRIEDMAN, supra note 229, at 156–65; LEE
GRIEVESON, POLICING CINEMA: MOVIES AND CENSORSHIP IN EARLY-TWENTIETH-CENTURY
AMERICA 4 (2004); RICHARD S. RANDALL, CENSORSHIP OF THE MOVIES: THE SOCIAL AND
POLITICAL CONTROL OF A MASS MEDIUM (1968).
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trials.”252 Fox and Van Sickel claim that attention to such trials reached some
sort of peak in the 1990s.253 In that decade, such trials as O.J. Simpson’s so
dominated the media as to amount to “almost total cultural immersion”; this
degree of “immersion” constituted, in their view, “a new phenomenon.”254
At the same time, censorship has ended, self-censorship has collapsed, and,
in the press and in the media in general, just about anything goes. The reasons
for this change—in law and society—are no doubt many and complex. But
clearly the transition to a celebrity society, with all that this entails, is one of
the factors in this development. The celebrity society demands total
(vicarious) access to the lives of the rich and the famous. Censorship—and
even reticence and privacy—must yield to an insatiable public demand.
Society in the developed world is largely middle-class society. Middleclass life is orderly and comfortable, compared to most societies in the past and
in the third world. Millions of members of the middle class, it seems, are
enthralled with what goes on above them, in the gilded world of the celebrities,
and below them, in the seedy, sinful, and vice-ridden domain of the
underworld. They seem also fascinated with the secretive world within their
own ranks, the scandals that occasionally erupt in suburbia and in their own
levels of society—scandals which reflect things that mostly happen privately,
behind bolted shutters and closed doors, and only rarely come to light. Many
of the famous trials combine aspects from all three of these social levels, and in
some of the trials, it is the very mixture of two or more that attracts the
attention of the public.
Perhaps, to a degree, the stories behind headline trials also evoke envy or
desire—hidden longings or, on the contrary, a grateful sense that our lives are
not like the unfortunate, tragic, or sordid lives that are on display. Or perhaps
what is attractive are the stories, events, and situations which are so radically
different from everyday life; they have the capacity, in short, to divert people
from their own humdrum lives. Headline trials in this sense act as a kind of
emotional and psychological tourism. These trials, after all, are not fiction.
They claim to be a slice of life. They are both alien and familiar at once.
Crimes that lead to headline trials—certainly tabloid trials—stem from
jealousy, lust, greed, anger, and hate. These are emotions most people have,
but for most people, they are not only intensely private but also intensely
contained. Murder may stem from everyday motives, but murders are not

252. FOX & VAN SICKEL, supra note 1, at 3. They define “tabloid justice” to include three
elements. First, the “educational function of the press is undermined by its entertainment role”
(hardly new, however); second, a “frenzy of media activity . . . envelops . . . legal proceeding”;
and third, an “attentive public . . . witnesses these legal travails and uses them as a means by
which to understand and assess the criminal justice process.” Id. at 4–5.
253. Id. at 54.
254. Id.
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everyday events. The trials today complement the countless movies and
television shows that focus on crime and punishment. The trials are, in a way,
cousins of reality television. In these dramas, actual men and women play
exciting and mysterious roles—roles played in movies and on television, but in
this case, by real people, not actors and actresses.
The trials are, as I said, a form of entertainment. And entertainment plays
a greater and greater role in people’s lives. In the rich, developed societies,
ordinary people do not need to work themselves to death. For many people, to
be sure, life is a scramble, a constant challenge, a treadmill. Nonetheless, there
is time off: days off, weekends, national holidays, vacations, and evenings at
home without the pressure of work. There is money jingling in the pockets of
average families which can be spent in discretionary ways. The entertainment
industry might well be the largest industry of all in developed countries, if you
add together sports, movies and television, video games, and the innumerable
hobbies of one sort or another.
Entertainment, then, broadly conceived, is pervasive in modern society. It
spills over and infects many other areas of life. Entertainment criteria, for
example, shape political life. More and more, the public judges politicians in
terms of image and in terms of something vaguely called “charisma.” For
many voters, ideology and programs seem to matter less than whether the
candidate can charm, soothe, inspire confidence and, in a sense, entertain. A
wooden, boring speaker is doomed at the polls. Moreover, television is a key
factor in modern political campaigns. Television ads have to catch the
attention of the public—to entertain, in short. Indeed, the worlds of
entertainment and politics are so intertwined that one author has called the
President the “entertainer-in-chief.”255
F.

The Vexed Question of Influence

The media cater to public taste, but they also help form it. Headline trials
in our day, then, are simply one small part of a giant system, a system which
feeds on and derives from mass culture, and whose basic aim is to divert, to
amuse, to entertain.
But even though these big trials do not seem to do anything else but feed
the appetite of the public and the media, they still have a wider significance.
They reflect social norms and they also, in a way, still do instruct. Whether
they mean to or not, they teach lessons about the nature of criminal justice, and
perhaps even about the nature of society. How important are these messages?
Do these trials make a difference in society? Do they change public attitudes
and behavior? These are of course difficult questions to answer—perhaps
impossible.

255. Kurt Andersen, Entertainer-in-Chief, NEW YORKER, Feb. 16, 1998, at 34.
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Headline trials certainly spread information (and misinformation) about the
criminal justice system. Almost anybody in this society can mouth the
standard of guilt in criminal trials; they know that the prosecution needs to
prove its case “beyond a reasonable doubt” (although exactly what that means
in practice is elusive, to say the least). Most people also know about the
Miranda warning, the right to remain silent, and so on. They know at least
something about juries, defense lawyers, witnesses, cross-examination,
instructions to the jury, and the like. But movies and the media coverage of
trials give the public a very incomplete and misleading picture of the way the
system works. There are two basic misconceptions which are, paradoxically,
quite contradictory. For one thing, media coverage gives the impression of a
meticulous system, a system of almost pathological due process. Everything is
done to a “T”—potential members of the jury are screened, probed,
questioned, needled, all to the end of keeping out anybody prejudiced or
unsuitable. The lawyers, during the trial, are eagle-eyed to detect and object to
mishandled evidence, incorrect cross-examination, and anything contrary to
justice and law. There is, in short, scrupulous attention to detail, all in the
interests of fairness to the defendant. Yet the audience can get, in addition—or
instead of this—the very opposite lesson: the lesson that tricks, smart
lawyering, and quirks of procedure can bend and twist the administration of
justice. That money can buy acquittal. For better or for worse, the media
focus on these high-profile but misleading cases and ignore, on the whole, the
humdrum, everyday administration of justice, with all its faults and virtues.
In an open society, and a mass media society, lawmaking is incredibly
sensitive to some forms of public opinion and, hence, to the imprint of
notoriety, scandal, sensational incidents, and outrageous events.256 Scandals
led to the creation of the first Food and Drug Administration, and another led
to amendments in 1938, which greatly strengthened the law.257 Laws on clean
air and water owe a lot to the Donora death fog, and similar public
catastrophes. The great oil spill of 2010 led to a moratorium on ocean drilling.
Business scandals have often led to changes in the regulatory structure.258 But
perhaps nowhere is the influence of scandal greater than in the criminal justice
system. The impact comes, on the whole, from sensational crimes rather than
from sensational trials. One could mention here “Megan’s Law,”259 which
256. On the meaning and social importance of scandal, see ADUT, supra note 232, at 5–22.
257. On this, see DANIEL CARPENTER, REPUTATION AND POWER: ORGANIZATIONAL IMAGE
AND PHARMACEUTICAL REGULATION AT THE FDA 73–76 (2010).
258. CARY COGLIANESE ET AL., THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 2
(Harvard Univ., Regulatory Policy Program Report No. RPP-08, 2004).
259. This law, passed originally in 1994, was a response to the murder of young Megan
Kanka. 2001 N.J. Laws 1187. People convicted of a “sex offense” are required to register; and
there are provisions for making the information available to members of the community in which
the offender lives. Id. There are now versions of this law apparently in all the states. There are

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

1282

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 55:1243

followed a dreadful crime in New Jersey, and the three-strikes law in
California, which had a similar background. The same is true of so-called
trials that arise out of moral panics. Here we can mention the various “red
scares,” the reaction to 9/11, and so on. Some moral panics work directly to
produce sensational trials—this goes all the way back to the Salem witchcraft
trials, as we noted, and in our day, to the McMartin child-care case.
Sensational trials themselves no doubt play at least some role in generating
movements to change the law. And new laws produced by scandal and moral
panic in turn produce their share of sensational trials. After the kidnapping of
Charles Lindbergh’s baby, Congress passed a law federalizing kidnap cases
whenever the kidnapper crossed state lines, and after a certain amount of time,
the law presumed that this had taken place.260 Many states passed “Little
Lindbergh” laws of their own, and this law was at the core of the Caryl
Chessman case; it accounts for the fact that the death penalty was imposed on
him.261 The trial of the Chicago Seven owes a great deal to the climate of
political hysteria associated with McCarthyism and the Cold War moral panic
over Communism. The McMartin case arose out of—and led to—a flurry of
legal activity, designed to end real (and imagined) child abuse.262
Probably today, the headline trial serves mostly to sell newspapers and
television time and to provide public diversion. To be sure, the usefulness of
the headline trial as a political instrument has of course not ended. Its
influence on the criminal justice system can certainly be labeled “political” in
the broadest sense. And the rise of international criminal tribunals suggests
that political trials, in a more literal sense, might be entering a golden age.
Huge publicity has surrounded the trials of men who committed atrocities—
crimes against humanity—in Liberia, Cambodia, in the former Yugoslavia.263
International criminal law shows signs of vigorous growth. Some of these
trials were carried out by ad hoc tribunals, but there is now an International
Criminal Court; most countries (though not the United States) have signed on,
and the court has made a promising beginning.264
And what of the other forms of headline trial? In an age of instant
communication, blogs, twitters, websites by the zillions, in which images and
ideas spread around the world in nanoseconds, the headline trial as a form of

other laws, too, which are commonly referred to by the name of the victim, for example,
“Jessica’s Law” in Florida. 2005 Fla. Laws 204–05.
260. 18 U.S.C. § 1201 (2006).
261. HAMM, supra note 69, at 56.
262. See supra notes 190–96 and accompanying text.
263. Lisa J. Laplante & Kelly Phenicie, Mediating Post-Conflict Dialogue: The Media’s Role
in Transitional Justice Processes, 93 MARQ. L. REV. 251, 277 (2009). See generally Jessica
Feinstein, The Hybrid’s Handmaiden: Media Coverage of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, 7
LOY. U. CHI. INT’L L. REV. 131 (2009–2010).
264. STACY, supra note 49, at 62–65.
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communication may seem like a kind of dinosaur—a lumbering, awkward
device left over from an earlier period. Yet there are no signs that the headline
trial is headed for the dustbin of history. Indeed, these trials help feed the
insatiable appetite of the public for diversion, information, and in a way,
instruction. Their place in the entertainment society—the celebrity society—
has never been greater, and is, if anything, likely to grow in the years to come.
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